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INTRODUCTION

In the forty years since the Supreme Court entered the “political
1
thicket” it has done much work. To mention just a few of its efforts,
in enforcing the Constitution the Court has required decennial redistricting of all state legislatures and multimember congressional dele2
gations under the rule of one person, one vote; it has laid down many
rules for how Congress and state legislatures can regulate campaign
3
spending; it has defined how politics has to take account—and can4
not take account—of race; and it has determined what kinds of elec-
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1
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
2
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-68 (1964) (state legislative districts); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (congressional districts).
3
See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619, 643-719 (2003) (upholding constitutionality of most portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002);
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161-63 (2003) (finding provisions and regulations of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 barring direct corporate campaign contributions to nonprofit advocacy corporation to be consistent with First Amendment);
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668-69 (1990) (upholding
a Michigan statute prohibiting corporations from using corporate treasury funds for
independent expenditures in support of or in opposition to candidates in elections for
state office); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143-44 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding in
part, and finding unconstitutional in part, the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971).
4
See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001) (holding that district
court’s finding that race, rather than politics, was the predominant factor in North
Carolina legislature’s congressional redistricting plan was clearly erroneous); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 639-52 (1993) (finding that an allegation that North Carolina’s
redistricting legislation was designed to segregate races for voting purposes was sufficient to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.
613, 627-28 (1982) (holding a Georgia county’s system of at-large elections unconstitutional); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767-70 (1973) (finding that a Texas House of
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5

toral structures are and are not permissible. In interpreting several
statutes, particularly the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it has also unset6
tled many traditional electoral arrangements. Nearly all of this work
has been difficult and contentious. In few other areas have the
Court’s decisions so directly and personally interested members of the
political branches of government while resting so weakly on the widely
recognized and traditionally authoritative guides to constitutional
construction (e.g., constitutional text and intent).
Beginning explicitly with Baker v. Carr, one argument, the “got
7
theory” argument, has had great play in these cases . The “got theory”
argument maintains that the Court must defer to the political
branches in these political cases to avoid freezing one particular the8
ory of politics into the structure of governance. No matter how certain the Court is that a particular theory of equality, representation, or
political behavior is right, the argument goes, it should nonetheless
refrain from striking down conflicting arrangements, because doing
so would displace the state’s own choice among competing and acceptable political theories. So stated, the “got theory” argument has
much to recommend it. It cautions judicial humility, recognizes diversity of judgment on matters concerning local conditions and traditions, and allows for experimentation by different parts of government. In short, the argument goes, often one size does not fit all.
The “got theory” argument made its greatest play in the reappor9
tionment cases. I discuss in Part I how the argument framed the issues in those cases. In general, how well did it work? Did it emphasize certain values and concerns and ignore others? Did it have an

Representatives reapportionment plan was not invidiously discriminatory, but that the
disestablishment of two multimember districts in the plan was justified because of the
history of discrimination against minorities in those districts.).
5
See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000) (holding unconstitutional the imposition of blanket primary against political party’s wishes);
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding poll tax unconstitutional).
6
See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (construing Voting Rights Act
of 1965 with respect to use of multimember districts in North Carolina legislative apportionment); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (applying Voting
Rights Act of 1965 to state election laws and regulations).
7
369 U.S. 186, 224-29 (1962).
8
See, e.g., infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s application of a “got theory” argument in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion)).
9
See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 330
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Colegrove, 328 U.S. 549 (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion).
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identifiable substantive agenda? And, in the end, did it fulfill or betray its rhetorical appeal? In Part II, I look at this argument in a more
contemporary setting: the partisan gerrymandering cases. After laying out the surprisingly complex issues these cases pose, I explore how
the “got theory” argument addresses and spins them. I conclude by
reflecting that, although the “got theory” argument could play a helpful role in deciding these and perhaps other cases, in practice it has
not. Instead of deepening consideration of the political concerns underlying the cases, the argument has been used to foreclose such consideration. It has operated more as a conversation stopper than as the
conversation starter its rhetoric suggests.
I. ENTERING THE “POLITICAL THICKET”
A. Initial Hesitation: Colegrove v. Green
10

Colegrove v. Green foreshadowed the deepest arguments in the reapportionment cases. Three voters sued to have declared unconstitutional an Illinois congressional districting scheme in which some districts contained many more people than others. The largest district,
in fact, contained 914,000 people—over eight times the 112,116 in the
11
smallest district. These three voters from larger districts claimed that
the scheme violated equal protection because they had proportionately less representation in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court did not even consider the claim. Both Justice Frankfurter, writing for a plurality of three Justices, and Justice Rutledge,
12
writing for himself, voted to dismiss the case for want of equity. The
voters’ first recourse, Justice Frankfurter thought, should be to the Illinois state legislature. If people were unhappy, they should simply
vote in a state legislature that would give them relief: “The remedy for
unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will appor13
tion properly . . . .” And, if that should fail, those from larger dis14
tricts should “invoke the ample powers of Congress” to fix things.
Because Justice Frankfurter believed that the Constitution “conferred
upon Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the

10
11
12

328 U.S. 549 (1946).
Id. at 566 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 551 (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion); id. at 565 (Rutledge, J., concur-

ring).
13
14

Id. at 556 (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion).
Id.
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States in the popular House and left to that House determination
15
whether States have fulfilled their responsibility,” he thought it deprived the courts of all power to act. The Constitution, by vesting
Congress with such authority, thus simply foreclosed the possibility of
judicial remedy.
More fundamentally, Justice Frankfurter believed that the case involved a choice among theories of representation that state legislatures should be able to make. As he put it:
The basis for the suit is . . . a wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity. In effect this is an appeal to the federal courts to reconstruct the electoral
process of Illinois in order that it may be adequately represented in the
councils of the Nation. Because the Illinois legislature has failed to revise its Congressional Representative districts in order to reflect great
changes, during more than a generation, in the distribution of its popu16
lation, we are asked to do this, as it were, for Illinois.
17

In his view, the case concerned no injury to individuals, but a
claim that the state’s political leaders were wasting Illinois’ representa18
tional capital in national politics. It asserted, in other words, an injury that ran to the state, not one that ran directly to some citizens
while favoring others. The case thus represented a kind of political
“derivative action” where the principals (voters) were suing the managing agents (state politicians) for malfeasance to the polity as a
whole. Any individual injury came only through a citizen’s stake in
the impaired polity.
Framed in this way, the case posed no question about how individuals should be represented in the House, but at most asked
whether the state’s choice of representational policy, which created
some districts with many more people than others, wasted the state’s
national influence. And as to that question, Justice Frankfurter
thought, the state’s political leaders were likely in a better position
19
than the federal courts to make a decision. To carry the “derivative
action” analogy one step further, the courts were as ill-suited to review
these kinds of political decisions as they are to review ordinary busi15

Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
Id. at 552 (citations omitted).
17
See id. (“The basis for the suit is not a private wrong . . . .”).
18
See id. (“In effect, this is an appeal to the federal courts to reconstruct the electoral process of Illinois in order that it may be adequately represented in the councils
of the Nation.”).
19
Cf. id. at 553 (“Nothing is clearer than that this controversy concerns matters
that bring courts into immediate and active relations with party contests. From the
determination of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof.”).
16
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ness decisions. Consequently, courts should follow a type of “political
judgment” rule, which just like its counterpart, the business judgment
rule, would insulate first-order decision makers from judicial second20
guessing.
Judicial deference, moreover, was particularly appropriate when
the courts, as Justice Frankfurter assumed, had no power to draw sin21
gle-member districts. At most, he thought, a court could declare an
existing single-member districting scheme unconstitutional, which
would mean that all of Illinois’ congressional candidates would have
22
to run in one statewide at-large district. It is at this point that Justice
Frankfurter grapples directly with the value of different theories of
representation. Even if the courts were to intervene and declare that
the state could not follow a particular view of what theory of representation best suited Illinois, the courts’ only remedy would be to impose
at-large House elections on the state—a practice that, he noted, itself
23
rested on a largely discredited theory of representation. Because of
his view of the courts’ limited remedial powers, then, Justice Frankfurter believed that striking a plan resting on a bad theory of representation might result in a plan resting on an even worse one.
Questions, of course, dog every step of Justice Frankfurter’s reasoning. Just to start, exactly where does the Constitution say Congress

20

See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (defining the business
judgment rule as the “presumption that in making a business decision the directors of
a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company”), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); see generally Douglas M. Branson, The Rule
that Isn’t a Rule—The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631 (2002) (discussing
and criticizing the business judgment rule); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, The Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573 (analyzing justifications for the business
judgment rule).
21
See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 553 (“Of course no court can affirmatively remap the
Illinois districts so as to bring them more in conformity with the standards of fairness
for a representative system.”).
22
Id.
23
See id. (“The upshot of judicial action may defeat the vital political principle
which led Congress, more than a hundred years ago, to require districting.”). As
Chancellor James Kent wrote:
[E]lection of members of Congress by districts . . . [is] recommended by the
wisdom and justice of giving, as far as possible, to the local subdivisions of the
people of each state, a due influence in the choice of representatives, so as
not to leave the aggregate minority of the people in a state, though approaching perhaps to a majority, to be wholly overpowered by the combined action
of the numerical majority, without any voice whatever in the national councils.
1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *230-31 (1873), quoted in Colegrove,
328 U.S. at 553.
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24

shall have exclusive remedial authority? If the text and original intent
of the Constitution do not make Congress’s remedial power exclusive,
should the Court do so, especially when Congress has long failed in
this area and individual congressmen’s incumbency interests weigh
against congressional action? As Justice Frankfurter himself methodi25
cally documented, so many states were severely malapportioned that
the principle of unseating a state’s congressional delegation on this
ground would have led to the unseating of many representatives,
which would have made it hard for many in Congress to vote for it.
And relying on state legislatures for a remedy was similarly unpromising. As Justice Black noted in dissent, the case rested in part on the
allegation that corresponding malapportionment of the Illinois state
26
legislature foreclosed any relief from that source. Furthermore, was
equity really insufficiently flexible at the time to permit courts to draw
single-member districts? And even if it was, was there any real risk that
a state legislature faced with at-large congressional districts would not
back down and draw equipopulous single-member districts?
Beyond remedy, the questions remain just as pressing. Why, for
example, was the voters’ injury derivative, not personal? The plaintiffs
were complaining, after all, that the scheme violated a personal right
27
to equal representation. Did they not have such a right? Or was it
one that the state could subordinate in the interest of best representing the state qua state? Should the Constitution, which originally intended the House of Representatives to represent the people rather
28
than the states as polities, allow the state to make such a choice? Jus24

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 & § 5, cl. 1 (establishing, in part, that “[t]he
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations,” and that “[e]ach House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members”).
25
See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 557-59 app. I (charting the disparities in apportionment between the largest and smallest district in each state).
26
See id. at 567 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he issues of state and congressional apportionment are thus so interdependent that it is to the interest of state legislators to
perpetuate the inequitable apportionment of both state and congressional election
districts.”).
27
See id. at 567 (“Appellants claim that since they live in the heavily populated districts their vote is much less effective than the vote of the those living in [the smallest
districts] . . . .”).
28
Indeed, the Framers intended that the House of Representatives be fixed in
such a way as to preclude state government control over the House:
[B]eing fixed by the State constitutions, [the House of Representatives] is not
alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of
the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to
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tice Frankfurter is simply silent on all of these questions. Still, if one
grants his initial assumptions (1) that the injury is derivative, not personal, and (2) that drawing a single statewide at-large district was the
only available judicial remedy, his approach has something to recommend it. The legislature is probably in a better position than a court
to decide what is best for the state as a polity and, if the at-large district stuck, the court would be imposing a poor theory of representa29
tion on the state. Furthermore, the individual voters’ claims would
not bear on any injury to the state itself. From this perspective their
claim to equal proportional representation in Congress would represent a claim for special, not equal, treatment relative to other citizens
because it would partially appropriate to some citizens an opportunity
that properly belongs to the polity as a whole. It would be as if a
shareholder demanded private use of a corporate asset.
Justice Frankfurter implicitly adopts here an early form of the “got
theory” argument, recognizing that a malapportionment claim would
impose a particular theory of representation on the state—the theory
that representation is a right that runs to individuals rather than to
the polity as a whole. His use of the argument, of course, is disappointing: he nowhere defends his major, controversial assumptions.
But in other ways his use of it makes good sense. He identifies a particular competing theory of representation that recognizing malapportionment claims would displace, finds value in that theory, and
thus rejects the invitation to displace it. In fact, he does this twice—
once in refusing to conceptualize malapportionment as involving an
individual right and once in rejecting what he sees as the only available judicial remedy as being worse than the harm itself. The “got
theory” argument allows him to identify and weigh the theories on
both sides and so serves to deepen and broaden the analysis. It does
not simply defer to state autonomy.
B. Jumping into the Thicket: Baker v. Carr
30

In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court opened the courthouse door
to exactly those claims that Colegrove foreclosed. The Tennessee Con-

abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 337 (James Madison (or Alexander Hamilton)) (Robert
Scigliano ed., 2000).
29
See supra note 23 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress and courts
agree that at-large districts are a poor alternative for representation).
30
369 U.S. 186 (1962).

466

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 459

stitution required that state representatives “be apportioned among
the several counties or districts, according to the number of qualified
31
voters in each,” and that state senators be apportioned “according to
32
the number of qualified electors.” Despite this express constitutional
command, the Tennessee General Assembly had not passed a reap33
portionment bill since 1901. Since then, the population of Tennessee had grown substantially and shifted across the state. In 1901, the
state’s population was 2,020,616 of whom 487,380 were eligible to
vote; in 1960, its population was 3,567,089 of whom 2,092,891 were
eligible to vote—an increase of more than 325% in the number of eli34
gible voters and more than 75% in the state’s total population. And,
as the Court noted, “[t]he relative standings of the counties in terms
35
of qualified voters ha[d] changed significantly.” By 1961, Tennessee’s most populous state senate district contained 5.2 times as many
36
people as the least populous district. The disparity in Tennessee’s
House of Representatives was even greater. There the largest district
37
was roughly eighteen times the size of the smallest.
Voters from the state’s larger districts sued to have the scheme declared unconstitutional, and a majority of the Court, although it did
38
not reach the merits, found the case justiciable. In heated dissents,
however, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan argued strongly that the
39
Court should not have heard the case. At bottom, they believed, the
case concerned a conflict between two competing theories of political

31

TENN. CONST. art. II, § 5 (prior to 1966 amendment).
Id. § 6.
33
Tennessee’s current apportionment scheme is set forth in TENN. CODE ANN. §
3-1-102 to -103 (Michie 1994 & 2001 Supp.). Except for a few minor revisions, see, e.g.,
1957 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 220 (increasing Shelby County’s number of representatives
from seven and one-half to eight), Tennessee had not significantly modified the 1901
reapportionment, 1901 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch.122, at the time of Baker v. Carr. See Baker,
369 U.S. at 187 & n.1, app. at 237-41 (discussing the history of reapportionment bills in
Tennessee and reprinting several of the most significant historical changes in Tennessee’s apportionment statute).
34
Baker, 369 U.S. at 192.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 274-75 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter points out that
this statistic is based on the number of voting-age persons in the districts. Consequently, Justice Frankfurter points out, the statistic may be inaccurate because it does
not account for other (i.e., non-age) voting eligibility restrictions, such as citizenship
and residency requirements. See id. at 274 n.7.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 237 (majority opinion).
39
Id. at 266-330 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 330-40 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32
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representation, both of which were permissible.
furter put it:

40

As Justice Frank-

What is actually asked of the Court in this case is to choose among competing bases of representation—ultimately, really, among competing
theories of political philosophy—in order to establish an appropriate
frame of government for the State of Tennessee and thereby for all the
States of the Union.
. . . What Tennessee illustrates is an old and still widespread method
of representation—-representation by local geographical division, only
in part respective of population—-in preference to others, others, forsooth, more appealing. Appellants contest this choice and seek to make
this Court the arbiter of the disagreement. They would make the Equal
Protection Clause the charter of adjudication, asserting that the equality
which it guarantees comports, if not the assurance of equal weight to
every voter’s vote, at least the basic conception that representation ought
to be proportionate to population, a standard by reference to which the
41
reasonableness of apportionment plans may be judged.

He then noted that in deciding such an apportionment claim, the
Court would have to inquire “into the theoretic base of representation
42
in an acceptably republican state”:
For a court could not determine the equal-protection issue without in
fact first determining the Republican-Form issue, simply because what is
reasonable for equal-protection purposes will depend upon what frame
of government, basically, is allowed. To divorce “equal protection” from
“Republican Form” is to talk about half a question.
The notion that representation proportioned to the geographic
spread of population is so universally accepted as a necessary element of
equality between man and man that it must be taken to be the standard
of a political equality preserved by the Fourteenth Amendment—-that it
is, in appellants’ words “the basic principle of representative government”—is, to put it bluntly, not true. . . . Unless judges, the judges of this

40

Cf. id. at 333 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat lies at the core of this controversy
is a difference of opinion as to the function of representative government.”). Generally accepted bases of representation include representation proportioned by population and fixed representation by geographical unit. Yet there have been many variations on both of these basic theories, including provisions for minimum and maximum
representations per district, and rules changing the aggregation of counties into districts (regardless of population). Variations may arise from the desire to support regional politics, limit the influence of metropolitan areas, or other political concerns.
See generally id. at 300-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (presenting various theories of
representation and their histories).
41
Id. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
42
Id. at 301.
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Court, are to make their private views of political wisdom the measure of
the Constitution—-views which in all honesty cannot but give the appearance, if not reflect the reality, of involvement with the business of
partisan politics so inescapably a part of apportionment controversies—the Fourteenth Amendment, itself a historical product, provides no
43
guide for judicial oversight of the representation problem.

To Frankfurter, several different bases of representation were possible. “Apportionment, by its character,” he wrote:
[I]s a subject of extraordinary complexity, involving—-even after the
fundamental theoretical issues concerning what is to be represented in a
representative legislature have been fought out or compromised—considerations of geography, demography, electoral convenience, economic and social cohesions or divergencies among particular local
groups, communications, the practical effects of political institutions like
the lobby and the city machine, ancient traditions and ties of settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of long experience and senior status,
mathematical mechanics, censuses compiling relative data, and a host of
44
others.

Presumably, to his mind, any of these concerns could legitimately
override equipopulousness.
Justice Harlan extended this “got theory” argument in two ways.
First, he defended against the obvious embarrassment that the Ten45
nessee legislature had failed to redistrict in over sixty years. In other
words, even if Justice Frankfurter’s alternative theories of representation were permissible in the abstract, one might well question whether
the Tennessee plan actually embodied any of them. Was it not simply
a product of inertia or perhaps of no public policy at all? Justice
Harlan argued, however, that the legislature’s long failure to redistrict
might itself reflect a deep judgment about the proper nature of representation. Assuming that the 1901 apportionment was originally valid,
46
which was actually contested in the case, Justice Harlan thought either that the plan might by accident have come to reflect some desirable theory of representation, which the legislature’s inaction endorsed, or that, even if the plan did not reflect a theory, the
43

Id. at 301-02 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id. at 323.
45
See id. at 336 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that it is within legislative discretion to defer reapportionment).
46
See id. at 192 (majority opinion) (“[T]he complaint alleges that the 1901 statute,
even as of the time of its passage, ‘made no apportionment of Representatives and
Senators in accordance with the constitutional formula . . . , but instead arbitrarily and
capriciously apportioned representatives in the Senate and House without reference . . . to any logical or reasonable formula whatever.’” (omissions in original)).
44
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legislature might legitimately have valued stability over whatever interests the original 1901 plan served. The courts, he wrote, are:
[A]sked to say that the passage of time has rendered the 1901 apportionment obsolete to the point where its continuance becomes vulnerable under the Fourteenth Amendment. But is not this matter one that
involves a classic legislative judgment? Surely it lies within the province
of a state legislature to conclude that an existing allocation of senators
and representatives constitutes a desirable balance of geographical and
demographical representation, or that in the interest of stability of government it would be best to defer for some further time the redistribu47
tion of seats in the state legislature.

Justice Harlan argued, in other words, that a principled theory of
representation could not only lead a legislature to draw districts of
very different sizes, but could also lead it to refuse to redistrict at all
for over 60 years—-even in the face of an express state constitutional
command to the contrary. His argument magically transformed seeming inertia into a robust and sound exercise of judgment over representational theories.
Second, Justice Harlan defended against the argument that the
legislature’s inaction had a simple and clear explanation: Tennessee
legislators’ interest in continued incumbency. With no redistricting,
those incumbents would retain the districts that had last elected them
and likely maintain their existing support among known constituents.
Interestingly, Justice Harlan did not argue that incumbent self-interest
was not the actual reason why the legislature had failed to act. He just
declared that even if that were the reason, it would be irrelevant. The
conclusion that the Court should not intervene, he thought:
[C]an hardly be escaped by suggesting that capricious state action might
be found were it to appear that a majority of the Tennessee legislators, in
refusing to consider reapportionment, had been actuated by self-interest
in perpetuating their own political offices or by other unworthy or improper motives. Since Fletcher v. Peck was decided many years ago, it has
repeatedly been pointed out that it is not the business of the federal
48
courts to inquire into the personal motives of legislators.

47

Id. at 336 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 337 (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810)). He would have applied
something like reduced scrutiny to the plan and declared that the federal courts simply had no role “once it appears . . . that the state action complained of could have
rested on some rational basis.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 338 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
48
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C. The Problems with Early “Got Theory” Arguments
and Justice Stewart’s “Third Way”
On their surface, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan’s arguments
have much appeal. By refusing to impose one particular and contestable vision of representation on the structure of politics, they would
allow states to experiment with different models and determine which
models best fit local cultures, traditions, and conditions. Stated this
way, the argument appears dynamic and progressive. Since the goodness of different theories of representation changes over time, leaving
the choice between theories open avoids freezing-in a particular, and
perhaps only temporary, consensus as to the proper structure of government. In this view, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan are not desperately defending the status quo, but struggling to preserve the people’s ability to debate one of the most fundamental issues of
democratic governance and to refashion politics. They, not the majority, are the champions of change and progress.
There are, however, some obvious difficulties with their use of the
“got theory” argument. For one thing, they fail to analyze any of the
49
competing theories they hold out as possibilities. Are all of them acceptable alternatives to equipopulousness? How much constitutional
weight, for example, should possibilities such as “the lobby and the
50
city machine” and “respect for proven incumbents” be given?
Should somewhat weightier-sounding concerns like “electoral conven51
ience” and “considerations of geography” completely or only partially trump equipopulousness? Failing to consider the legitimacy of a
competing theory can lead to much difficulty. Under this approach,
for example, many long-discredited political practices would be unobjectionable. Many parts of the country, for example, long employed
52
property qualifications and defended them as a way of ensuring that
53
the electorate was informed, engaged, and independent. Only those
who held property, the argument ran, had enough stake in the community to be trusted to do what was truly best for all and to be free
from economic dependence on, and thus coercion from, others,
49

See supra note 40 (identifying competing bases of representation).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
51
Id.
52
See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE app. tbls.A.1-A.3, A.9, A.11, & A.13
(2000) (documenting property qualifications in state suffrage requirements over
time).
53
See id. at 5, 9 (describing the arguments for property qualifications in the colonial era and after the American Revolution).
50
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which would prevent the exercise of independent judgment. Nowadays, however, a court would view property qualifications with great
suspicion. The problem is not that no theory could support them, but
55
rather that we now think it would be a bad theory. Contemporary
conceptions of democracy wholly discredit property qualifications and
the like.
In addition to failing to evaluate alternatives, Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan’s “got theory” argument fails even to inquire whether an
alternative actually supports the disputed plan. If only because the
legislature had not redistricted in over sixty years, one might suspect
that Tennessee’s malapportionment reflected something other than
merely a theory of representation different from the plaintiffs’ theory.
Indeed, one might suspect any number of legislative motives that
would reflect anything but laudable theories of representation. For
instance, one might suspect that the legislature’s failure to redistrict
reflected a desire to disenfranchise voters, or perhaps that the failure
was a result of gross self-interest on the part of incumbent legislators.
And while Justice Harlan ingeniously portrays the Tennessee legislature’s inaction as a careful balancing aimed at political stability, he
proves too much with this argument. Without requiring any evidence
that the legislature deliberately chose not to act, Justice Harlan’s argument would protect plans reflecting no legitimate reasons at all.
The mere possibility that concern for stability could explain the districting scheme would foreclose any claim of inertial malapportionment.
Consider how this type of “got theory” argument would have addressed two other now notorious electoral practices: poll taxes and
literacy tests. For much of our history, many argued that both practices promoted republican aims. Poll taxes, it was claimed, ensured
that all who voted would care about public affairs. If voting came at a
54

Id. at 5.
Cf. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (invalidating poll
tax on similar grounds, and stating that “[v]oter qualifications have no relation to
wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax”); see generally KEYSSAR, supra
note 52, at 269-73 (discussing the gradual elimination of economic voting qualifications through statute and constitutional decisions); J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in
American Political and Constitutional Thought, 45 B.C. L. REV. 499, 512-16 (2004) (placing
the invalidation of property qualifications and poll taxes in the context of “growing
egalitarianism in American politics”); Ronnie L. Podolefsky, The Illusion of Suffrage:
Female Voting Rights and the Women’s Poll Tax Repeal Movement After the Nineteenth Amendment, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 185, 235-37 (1998) (placing the poll tax debate in the
context of the civil rights and gender equality movements, arguing that poll taxes were
discriminatory).
55
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cost, only those who cared would vote and electoral outcomes would
56
reflect sound judgment. Literacy tests, it was argued, serve a similar
civic function. In theory, they ensured that all who voted could read
and had enough basic understanding of American government to cast
57
an informed and independent ballot. Despite these lofty purposes,
however, there was much evidence that many jurisdictions adopted
and continued to employ these devices for illegitimate reasons: most
58
notably, to frustrate voting by African Americans and, in some cases,
59
poor whites. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan’s approach, however,
would have ignored the actual discriminatory reasons for the devices’
continued use in favor of a hypothetical rationale that mattered not at
all to those who used them. In their view, the mere possibility of a
civic rationale, no matter how tarnished by history, would overcome
60
strong evidence of invidious motivation.

56

See Harper, 383 U.S. at 674 (Black, J., dissenting) (“State poll tax legislation can
‘reasonably,’ ‘rationally’ and without an ‘invidious’ or evil purpose to injure anyone be
found to rest on [the need for revenue collection and the] belief that voters who pay a
poll tax will be interested in furthering the State’s welfare when they vote.”); id. at 677
(noting “the long-standing beliefs that making the payment of a tax a prerequisite to
voting is an effective way of collecting revenue and that people who pay their taxes are
likely to have a far greater interest in their government”); id. at 684-85 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is certainly a rational argument that payment of some minimal poll tax
promotes civic responsibility, weeding out those who do not care enough about public
affairs to pay . . . for the exercise of the franchise.”); A.F. THOMAS, THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION AND ITS POSSIBILITIES 12 (1901).
57
As the Supreme Court noted in upholding literacy tests:
[I]n our society where newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed matter canvass and debate campaign issues, a State might conclude that only
those who are literate should exercise the franchise. It was said last century in
Massachusetts that a literacy test was designed to insure an independent and
intelligent exercise of the right to suffrage.
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 52 (1959) (quotation
marks and citations omitted); see also SAMUEL JONES, TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE 132-33 (Boston, Otis, Broaders & Co. 1842) (arguing that a basic education is
necessary to enable people to exercise their right to vote in a manner that is beneficial
to the public).
58
See J.N. BRENAMAN, A HISTORY OF VIRGINIA CONVENTIONS 89-90 (1902) (discussing Virginia’s use of literacy tests and poll taxes in its 1901-1902 constitutional convention to disenfranchise African American voters); KEYSSAR, supra note 52, at 111-13 (describing efforts in the late nineteenth century to disenfranchise African American
voters).
59
FREDERIC D. OGDEN, THE POLL TAX IN THE SOUTH 1-31 (1958) (arguing that
the “disenfranchising movement” reflected a combination of factors, including the desire to contain the populist movement by disenfranchising poor whites).
60
Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 335-36 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the issue at stake in Baker is not racial or religious discrimination and therefore is not covered by the Equal Protection Clause).
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To his credit, Justice Stewart, who was very sympathetic to Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan’s position, recognized its problems. In Lucas
61
v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, the Court struck down a
Colorado state reapportionment scheme favored by a majority of voters in every county over a competing plan that much more closely
62
drew districts of equal population. Justice Stewart, in dissent, would
have upheld the plan despite its population variance. His test looked
in Justices Frankfurter and Harlan’s direction but sought to avoid
their difficulties. His test had two critical parts:
First, [the Equal Protection Clause] demands that, in the light of the
State’s own characteristics and needs, the plan must be a rational one.
Secondly, it demands that the plan must be such as not to permit the systematic frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate of the State.
I think it is apparent that any plan of legislative apportionment which
could be shown to reflect no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious
action or inaction, and that any plan which could be shown systematically to prevent ultimate effective majority rule, would be invalid under
accepted Equal Protection Clause standards. But, beyond this, I think
there is nothing in the Federal Constitution to prevent a State from
choosing any electoral legislative structure it thinks best suited to the in63
terests, temper, and customs of its people.

Unlike his two colleagues, Justice Stewart would have at least
checked to ensure that some minimally rational theory actually supported the state’s plan and that the plan did not systematically frustrate majorities. Each part of his test would have done some important work. The first would have looked through the hypothetical
justifications Justices Frankfurter and Harlan would have accepted,
while the second would have ensured that the state paid some attention
to equipopulousness. A plan departing too sharply from this value
64
would necessarily frustrate the will of some numerical majority.
Justice Stewart’s approach, of course, has its own problems. Most
65
notably, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a court to administer. By
requiring courts to analyze whether districting plans are rational in
61

377 U.S. 713 (1964).
Id. at 730-35.
63
Id. at 753-54 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
64
Cf. Lucas, 377 U.S. at 754 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is apparent that any plan
of legislative apportionment which could be shown to reflect no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action or inaction, and that any plan which could be shown systematically to prevent ultimate effective majority rule, would be invalid under accepted
Equal Protection Clause standards.” (footnote omitted)).
65
See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW 56-59 (2003)
(discussing Justice Stewart’s judicially unmanageable standard).
62

474

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 459

light of the state’s own characteristics and needs, the plan invites embarrassing and difficult judicial inquiry. A court would have to sit in
judgment of the merits of asserted state policies, make sure that the
plan actually reflected them, and then weigh those policies against the
competing demands of one person, one vote. None of those tasks is
66
well-suited to judicial inquiry. Whatever the faults of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan’s approach—-giving the states a free pass—-it would
67
have certainly avoided these difficulties and embarrassments.
The Court’s divisions in these early apportionment cases reveal
three possible approaches. First, the Court, as Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan’s “got theory” argument advocated, could simply assume
that the state is acting—-or not acting—-for a valid reason no matter
what evidence to the contrary there may be. Such an approach is
68
clearly administrable because it requires a court to do nothing. Even
a redistricting plan reflecting only incumbent legislators’ desires to be
reelected will satisfy it. Second, the Court, as Justice Stewart’s version
of the “got theory” argument recommended, could check to make
sure that some valid theory supported the plan and require that some
attention be paid to one particular theory—equipopulousness. But
while such an approach gives states and localities some choice among
different theories of representation, judges are not well equipped or
situated to apply it. Third, as a majority of the Court eventually held
in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court could impose some version of the one
69
person, one vote standard. This standard is easily administered by
courts,
but
vindicates
one
theory
of
representation—
equipopulousness—at the expense of all others. Only individuals
count in this theory of representation.
The Court did not ultimately choose one person, one vote merely
because it was the only administrable approach. It was not. Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan’s approach was even easier to apply. Nor did

66

See Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 190 (1968) (noting the difficulties inherent in courts making political decisions, in part because of “the practical impossibility of constructing a completely coherent system of constitutional law at any
given time”).
67
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter’s approach in Colegrove was attractive, in large part,
because it allowed judicial humility and deference. See, e.g., supra text accompanying
notes 21-23.
68
For instance, under Justice Frankfurter’s “got theory” approach, the Court simply refused to allow voters’ claims in Colegrove.
69
377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that state legislative districts must be divided
equally by population).
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the Court choose it because it represented the only legitimate theory
of representation. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan were right about
70
that. Rather, the Court chose it because it felt that some valid theory
of representation should underlie apportionment, and one person,
one vote was the only administrable approach that would ensure
71
that. “Got theory” approaches, which would allow plans to embody
other theories of representation, would either, like Justices Frankfurter and Harlan’s approach, also allow plans to embody no legitimate theory at all or, like Justice Stewart’s, be unadministrable in
practice. No approach other than imposing some particular theory
could, practically speaking, ensure that a districting plan did indeed
rest on some legitimate theory. Despite its rhetorical progressiveness,
the “got theory” argument, as invoked by Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan, amounts to a cry to protect the status quo. It fails on its promise to encourage states to choose a political theory. By simply hypothesizing legitimate purposes that could underlie redistricting, it
forecloses discussion about the very issues it claims are so important.
II. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING: THE NEXT GENERATION
Partisan gerrymandering poses many of the same issues posed by
redistricting plans. And the central question remains the same:
should the courts enter the “political thicket?” Are judicially manageable standards available to discipline the practice? To what extent
does regulating partisan gerrymandering impose a particular and contestable theory of politics on the political process? And are other
permissible theories of politics compatible with this practice? Unsurprisingly, the “got theory” argument has made several appearances in
gerrymandering cases. To understand its significance and how it operates in this area, first we must understand what the partisan gerrymandering battle is all about. Although it of course concerns one major political party intentionally drawing districts to advantage itself at
the expense of the other, the battle concerns much more than that.
On the federal level, where I will exclusively discuss gerrymandering,
it raises issues about the purpose and function of the House of Representatives, the value of political competition, and how voters should
70

See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing competing theories of representation and Justices Frankfurter and Harlan’s view that many different theories of
representation are permissible).
71
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568-69 (dismissing the other proposed plans as “little more
than crazy quilts, completely lacking in rationality” and deviating too egregiously from
population based divisions).
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be represented. In this Part, I will lay out my own—perhaps tendentious—views on these issues. Whether one agrees with my particular
positions on these issues, however, is unimportant to the overall argument. Feel free to disagree and argue with them. To understand
how the “got theory” argument operates in this area it is important
only to understand the issues themselves; it is not necessary to agree
with my positions on them.
A. Gerrymandering the House of Representatives
The Framers envisioned the House of Representatives as a unique
structure of the national government. Unlike the Senate, the President, or the courts, it was to have “an immediate dependence on, and
72
an intimate sympathy with, the people.” As John Adams put it, the
body of the people’s representatives should “be in miniature an exact
portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act
73
like them.” With this in mind, the Framers carefully designed the
House with an eye toward “binding the representatives to their constituents” and to “extend[ing] the influence of the people over their
74
representatives.” They insisted on direct election “by the People of
75
76
the several States,” a broad franchise, regular reapportionment as
77
78
among the states, and frequent elections. Of these, the last was the
most important, for “without the restraint of frequent elections” in the
House, the Framers thought, “[a]ll [other] securities [against oligar79
chy] would be found very insufficient.” By this device:

72

THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 337 (James Madison (or Alexander Hamilton))
(Robert Scigliano ed., 2000).
73
John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 87 (Robert J.
Taylor ed., 1979).
74
THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 339 (James Madison (or Alexander Hamilton))
(Robert Scigliano ed., 2000).
75
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
76
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 366 (James Madison (or Alexander Hamilton))
(Robert Scigliano ed., 2000) (discussing the composition of electorate).
77
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 356-57 (James Madison (or Alexander Hamilton)) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000) (noting the effect of the census on the composition
of the House of Representatives).
78
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 337 (James Madison (or Alexander Hamilton))
(Robert Scigliano ed., 2000) (citing frequent elections as the only way to maintain
common interests between the elected and the people).
79
THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 367 (James Madison (or Alexander Hamilton))
(Robert Scigliano ed., 2000).
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[T]he House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the
members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people.
Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their
elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled
to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from
which they were raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful dis80
charge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it.

Nearly every special feature of the House’s design was meant to ensure
that it, unlike the other primary structures of the federal government,
was highly responsive to public sentiment.
To some people, congressional redistricting has defeated much of
the Framers’ vision. They believe that high rates of incumbent reelection, declining competitiveness of congressional districts, and long periods of one-party control of the House have eroded the accountabil81
ity and legitimacy of the people’s chamber. The 2002 congressional
elections suggest this point strongly. Only four challengers defeated
House incumbents—the lowest number in modern American his82
tory. Only forty-three House incumbents, moreover, won reelection
“narrowly”—defined generously as by less than sixty percent of the
vote—while 338 House incumbents enjoyed very large victory margins—twenty percent or more, including seventy-eight incumbents
83
who ran unopposed by a major party challenger. In the nation’s
largest state, California, not a single challenger in the general election
84
received as much as forty percent of the vote. And more than a third
of all States sent exactly the same House delegation to Congress as was
85
in place before the election.

80

Id.
The best and most forceful advocate of this position is Sam Hirsch. See Sam
Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest Round
of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 179 (2003) (discussing how “redistricting has helped to transform the U.S. House of Representatives into a body that will
no longer accurately reflect majority will”).
82
Id. at 182; see also MICHAEL J. DUBIN, UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 1788-1997: THE OFFICIAL RESULTS, at xx-xxi (1998) (showing percentage of incumbents defeated in each election from the 2nd to the 105th Congresses); NORMAN J.
ORNSTEIN, THOMAS E. MANN, & MICHAEL J. MALBIN, VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS
2003-2004 (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at tbl.2-10) [hereinafter VITAL STATISTICS], to be available at http://www.aei.org.
83
VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 82, at tbl.2-12.
84
Hirsch, supra note 81, at 182.
85
Id.
81
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These facts are particularly striking because the 2002 elections
86
were the first elections held after the latest reapportionment. Historically, incumbents suffer in such elections. As their old voters disappear and new voters replace old voters, incumbents usually find
their seats less secure. These new voters can have quite different interests than previous constituents. From 1972 to 1992, in fact, House
turnover averaged forty-five percent higher in immediate postreapportionment Congresses. These Congresses contained an average of eighty-seven freshmen, while the others in this period con87
tained only sixty. In 2002, however, only fifty-four freshmen were
88
elected to the House—less than half the number elected in 1992. In
2002, incumbents had a very easy ride overall. Only thirty-five incumbents retired (rather than the average of forty-eight in other recent
post-reapportionment Congress), only eight lost in the primaries, and
only eight lost in the general election—in each case half the losses
89
were to another incumbent. This lack of competition was, moreover,
peculiar to the people’s chamber. On the same day that less than ten
percent of House races were being decided by margins of ten percent
or less, nearly half of all gubernatorial and U.S. Senate races were that
90
close. As one critic of the practice has pointed out, no one can ger91
rymander a statewide district.
To critics of partisan gerrymandering, current political conditions
have both increased the incentives to gerrymander and exacerbated
the democratic pathologies caused by gerrymandering. Over the last
fifteen years, American politics on the national level has been subject
to a striking paradox: it has become much more competitive at the
macro level, when it comes to institutional control, but much less
competitive at the micro level, when it comes to individual seats. Recent presidential elections have been very close and the Senate and
House have been evenly or nearly evenly divided. As the 2000 elections showed, the two major parties enjoy nearly equal popular support across the nation as a whole. While one presidential candidate
won a plurality of votes, the other won a victory in the Electoral Col-

86

See id. at 184 (discussing reapportionment following the 2000 census).
Id. at 183.
88
VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 82, at tbl.2-7.
89
Id.
90
Hirsch, supra, note 81, at 183.
91
See id. (discussing the peculiarity that roughly half the Senate elections were
competitive, despite the lack of competition in the House elections during the same
period).
87
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lege; the Senate became split exactly in two; and the majority party’s
92
control of the House stood on an extremely slim margin (221-212).
In terms of popular support, the two major parties are more
93
evenly matched than at any time since the nineteenth century. And
although the midterm elections of 2002 increased the size of the rul94
ing party’s margin in the House by six seats, that margin still stands
near its modern low. The 2002 elections culminated a decade-long
trend. The largest margin of majority in the House since 1992 was less
than one-third the historical average from 1960 until 1992, and the
average margin for the last ten years is barely one-sixth of the average
95
for the preceding period. By any standard—historical or absolute—
the margin of control in the House has been astonishingly narrow
over the past ten years.
At first that might appear to be a good thing. After all, one might
think that small margins of control would force the parties to cooperate, solve problems together, and allow some of their more centrist
representatives a greater voice. However, the opposite may be true.
First, the major parties in the House have become increasingly
96
homogeneous and ideologically polarized. Poole-Rosenthal DWNOMINATE scores, a widely accepted measure of congressional ideology, show how markedly the parties have diverged over the last thirty
97
years. These scores place each member of Congress on a liberalconservative scale from -1.0 (liberal) to 1.0 (conservative) on the basis
of nonunanimous roll call votes. From the early 1970s on, the average
scores for House members of the Democratic and Republican parties
98
have steadily and radically diverged. In fact, the score gap nearly
92

Gary C. Jacobson, A House and Senate Divided: The Clinton Legacy and the Congressional Elections of 2000, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 5, 5 (2001).
93
Id. at 5-6.
94
Hirsch, supra note 81, at 182 (noting the direction and magnitude of the shift in
House seats in the 2002 midterm election).
95
See Brief of Political Scientists Bernard Grofman and Gary Jacobson as Amici
Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 4 fig.1, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004)
(No. 02-1580) (charting the size of House majorities between 1960 and 2002; the largest margin after 1992 is 13, the average margin for the period 1960 to 1992 is 45).
96
See GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 242-50 (5th
ed. 2001).
97
See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING chs. 2-4, app. A (1997) (explaining and justifying DWNOMINATE scores as a method of measuring congressional ideology); see also David
Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A
Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 980-81 (1999) (using DWNOMINATE scores to evaluate committee and party preferences).
98
See Brief of Political Scientists at 11 fig.6, Vieth (No. 02-1580).
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doubled over that time and now amounts to over 0.86 points on what
99
is only a 2-point scale.
Second, the major parties in the House have become much more
internally homogeneous. There is now much less divergence than before within each party. As a comparison of Figures 1 through 4 shows,
not only have both parties in the House shifted more towards the extremes, leading to less overlap in their policy positions, but each party
100
has a much more cohesive focus than before.
101

Figure 1: 93rd Congress (1973-1974)
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See id. at 9 (showing an increase from slightly less than 0.5 for the 87th Congress
in the 1961-1962 term, to well over 0.8 by the 106th Congress in the 1999-2000 term).
100
JACOBSON, supra note 96, at 246-47 figs.8-4A to -4D.
101
Figure 1 is taken from id. at 246 fig.8-4A.
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Figure 2: 97th Congress (1981-1982)
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Figure 3: 101st Congress (1989-1990)
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Figure 2 is taken from id. at 246 fig.8-4B.
Figure 3 is taken from id. at 247 fig.8-4C.
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Figure 4: 105th Congress (1997-1998)
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In other words, the two major parties in the House have become
increasingly discrete and insular. On policy issues, they are both more
distant from each other and more internally homogeneous than before.
In such a world, small differences matter. The increasingly narrow margins of control over the past ten years mean that a gain of just
a few seats can completely switch party control of the House. From
the 1970s through the early 1990s, for example, changes of up to
twenty-five seats in any election would have made no difference to
105
which party controlled the House. After 1992, however, a difference
of as few as six seats and at most thirteen would have made all the dif106
The increasing homogeneity of each party over that same
ference.
time, moreover, means that the party in control now should have a

104

Figure 4 is taken from id. at 247 fig.8-4D.
For example, the 92nd Congress (1971-1973 term) had a seventy-five seat Democrat-Republican differential—255 Democrats and 180 Republicans—in the House
of Representatives. See DUBIN, supra note 82, at 675. The 103rd Congress (1993-1995
term) had an eighty-two seat Democratic-Republican differential—258 Democrats, 176
Republicans, and one independent—in the House of Representatives. See id. at 785.
106
For example, the 104th Congress (1995-1997 term) had just a twenty-six seat
Republican-Democrat differential—230 Republicans, 204 Democrats, and one independent—in the House of Representatives. If just thirteen districts had voted for Democrats instead of Republicans, the House would have been equally divided. See id. at
796.
105
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greater focus and should have to worry less about its individual members deviating from its preferred policy positions. The increasing polarization sharply raises the stakes of House control for each side.
Since larger policy differences separate the parties, such control presumably has a greater effect on legislative policy outcomes.
In the 1970s, when less distance separated the two parties and they
were less homogeneous, control of the House mattered less because
the policy outcomes sought and produced under one party would
have been relatively similar to those sought and produced under the
other. Once the parties’ policy preferences markedly diverged and
party members in the House voted more in lockstep than before, the
policy stakes greatly increased. Because of their ideological polarization, each party wants more extreme policies than before and, because of homogenization, the party in control finds it much easier to
107
Thus, the
achieve its preferred policies, even with a small margin.
stakes of redistricting have grown in two mutually reinforcing ways:
narrow margins of control mean that differences in just a few seats can
change which party controls the House, and a difference in party control makes a much larger difference in legislative policy outcomes.
Shifting fewer seats produces larger legislative payoffs than before.
To gain seats through redistricting requires a party in control of
the redistricting process in individual states to follow a simple strategy:
that party must make its opponent’s districts as few as possible and its
own as many as possible. To minimize the number of opposition districts, the party in control must pack as many of its opponent’s voters
as possible into each district the opponent controls. This leads to the
opposition party winning districts by a landslide, but winning fewer
districts. By contrast, to maximize the number of its own districts, the
controlling party must assign as few of its own voters to as many districts as it can while maintaining a reliable majority in each of them.
This leads to the controlling party giving itself a comfortable but less
sizeable margin in the maximum number of districts. The strategy
thus aims to make virtually every district noncompetitive and achieves
its partisan ends by making the districts differentially noncompetitive
for each party. By creating super-safe districts for the opposing party
and merely safe districts for itself, the controlling party “wastes” minority party votes and efficiently distributes its own. Knowing that
“one person, one vote” and race are virtually their only legal con-

107

In other words, because homogenization reduces ideological differences within
a party, members of a given party are more likely to share ideologies and goals.
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straints, party strategists feel free to draw such lines. In a real sense,
representatives can reflect the districts of the people, rather than the
people of the districts.
A party, of course, wants to reach no further than it can reliably
grasp. Otherwise, a small shift in public opinion can cause its gerry109
mandering to backfire, giving the district to the other party.
To
prevent this, the party in control of redistricting can be expected to
give itself more than a thin margin of victory in its districts. It may
even sacrifice a seat or two to ensure that it will maintain control over
a majority of districts should voter sentiment shift somewhat in the
later years of the reapportionment cycle. This insurance reduces
competition in nearly every district. The party that is victim to the
gerrymander will enjoy wins in as few districts as possible but will win
each by a landslide; the party in control of the gerrymander will enjoy
wins in a disproportionately large number of districts but by smaller
margins. Few, if any, districts will remain in true competition.
Empirical research shows how great this effect is. As one leading
political scientist describes it, redistricting after the last census gave:
[M]arginal incumbents of both parties got safer districts. Redistricting
gave eight Democrat incumbents who had been representing Bushmajority districts [districts in which Republican George W. Bush had
won the popular vote in the 2000 presidential election] new Goremajority districts [districts in which Democrat Al Gore had won the
popular vote in that election]; only one suffered the contrary switch . . . .
All thirteen of the switches involving Republican incumbents were from
Gore- to Bush-majority districts. Of the twenty-five districts Republicans
had won in 2000 with less than 55 percent of the major-party vote, eighteen were strengthened by increasing the proportion of Bush voters; of
the nineteen similarly marginal Democratic districts, fifteen were given a
larger share of Gore voters. Thus three quarters of the marginal districts
were made safer by redistricting, half of them by more than 2 percentage
points (in presidential vote share). If analysis is confined to districts with
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See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that state legislative districts must be divided equally by population); see also David M. Guin et al., Redistricting in 2001 and Beyond: Navigating the Narrow Channel Between the Equal Protection
Clause and the Voting Rights Act, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 225, 228 (1999) (listing districting
principles, including one person, one vote); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why
Voting is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1204-05 (1996) (explaining how one person,
one vote limits apportionment possibilities); Eric J. Stockman, Constitutional Gerrymandering: Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1227, 1257 (1993)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s one person, one vote limit on reapportionment).
109
Cf. BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 151-59 (1984) (“If [the
party] believes that future electoral or demographic tides will flow in its direction, then
the party will be more willing to take chances by creating more competitive seats.”).
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marginal incumbents who sought reelection in 2002, thirty-two of their
110
forty districts (80 percent) were made safer by redistricting.

In individual states, the effects could be even more extreme. Gerrymandering in California after the last census, for example, “left not
a single one of the state’s fifty-three House districts truly competi111
tive.”
Long-term trends exacerbate this effect. Since at least the midtwentieth century, competitiveness in House districts has markedly
declined. In the decade of elections after the 1960s reapportionment,
for example, an average of 74 seats were won with less than 55% of the
112
majority party vote. In the decade of elections after the 1990s reapportionment, by contrast, that figure fell by more than 10% to 65
113
seats.
More ominously, in the years prior to the 2002 election (with the
exception of the 1972 Nixon-McGovern election), elections immediately following reapportionment have always shown an increase in district competitiveness. As one commentator has summed up the data
shown in Table 1:
[E]lections held in the immediate aftermath of reapportionment . . .
have generated particularly large freshman classes and have returned
fewer incumbents than have other elections. On average, more incumbents retire from the House in post-reapportionment election cycles,
more are defeated in primaries, more lose in the November general
elections, and fewer win landslide reelections. . . . [O]n average, since
1972, membership turnover has been about 45% larger in postreapportionment Congresses, with 87 freshmen rather than 60. If anything, this tendency for greater turnover in post-redistricting election cycles had appeared to be increasing, as the 1992 elections had generated
a freshman class with 110 members.
The normal pattern did not hold up in 2002. Quite the opposite:
The 108th Congress (2003-2004) will have only 54 freshmen—fewer than
in the typical non-reapportionment election cycle, far below the norm
for a redistricting year, and less than half the 1992 figure. . . .

110

Gary C. Jacobson, Terror, Terrain, and Turnout: Explaining the 2002 Midterm Elections, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 10 (2003).
111
Id.
112
See Brief of Political Scientists at 6 fig.2, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769
(2004) (No. 02-1580) (showing that 74 seats in 1962, 106 in 1964, 74 in 1966, 63 in
1968, and 52 in 1970 were won with less than fifty-five percent of the majority vote).
113
Id. (showing that 81 seats in 1992, 85 in 1994, 77 in 1996, 42 in 1998, and 42 in
2000 were won with less than fifty-five percent of the majority vote).
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This lack of competition was peculiar to U.S. House elections: On
the same day when barely one out of twelve House elections were being
decided by ten percentage points or less, roughly half of all gubernato114
rial and U.S. Senate elections were that close.

Table 1: Comparison of the 2002 Election with
115
Elections from 1972 through 2000

Category

Incumbents
Reelected
By >20 Points
By <20 Points

Average “Normal”
Election
(1974-1980,
1984-1990,
1994-2000)

Average PostReapportionment
Election
(1972, 1982, 1992)

2002 Election

375

348

381

297
78

261
87

338
43

Incumbents Defeated
In the Primary
In the General

21
3
18

35
13
22

16
8
8

Incumbent
Retirements

37

48

35

New Members

60

87

54

Deadened competition has both individual and aggregate effects.
On the individual level, it means that representatives have less fear of
the regular judgment of the voters. The less competitive districts are,
the less incumbents will fear defeat at the polls, thus making them less
responsive to general election voters. A representative who squeaks by
will be very sensitive to what constituents want; a representative assured of a landslide will be less so. Uncompetitive districts, then,
weaken the structures of accountability that the Framers believed
made members of the House truly responsive to—and thus truly representative of—the people.
On the aggregate level, deadened competition means that the
House of Representatives as a whole will not reflect changes in sentiment among voters as well. Because so few districts can realistically
change parties, the House as a whole will fail to track shifts in underly-

114
115

Hirsch, supra note 81, at 183.
The data shown in Table 1 are taken from id. at 183 tbl.1.

2004]

GOT THEORY?

487

ing popular opinion. A national swing of five percent in voter opinion—a sea change in most elections—will change very few seats in the
current House of Representatives. Gerrymandering thus creates a
kind of inertia that arrests the House’s dynamic process. It makes it
less certain that votes in the chamber will reflect shifts in popular
opinion, and thus frustrates change and creates undemocratic slippage between the people and their government.
Although partisan gerrymandering deadens competition within
individual districts, that is its method, not its aim. Its aim, of course, is
to give one of the major parties an advantage over the other in Con116
gress. Comparing the major parties’ shares of the 2000 presidential
vote in the pre- and post-reapportionment House districts demonstrates how thoroughly current political gerrymandering has achieved
this. As Gary Jacobson has explained, “[t]he Bush-Gore vote division
provides an excellent approximation of district partisanship. Shortterm forces were evenly balanced in 2000, and party line voting was
the highest in decades; hence, both the national and district-level vote
117
reflected the underlying partisan balance with unusual accuracy.”
In other words, districts won by Democratic candidate Al Gore are
generally Democratic while districts won by Republican candidate
George W. Bush are generally Republican. As Figure 5 shows, the
post-census redistrictings helped make many districts comfortably but
leanly Republican and many other districts landslide Democratic. The
last cycle of redistricting, in other words, made the parties’ seats differentially safe in a way that gave one side an artificial edge in the
House.

116

See, e.g., Richard G. Niemi, The Relationship Between Votes and Seats: The Ultimate
Question in Political Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. REV. 185, 187-88 (1985) (noting that
gerrymandering “is an inherently political process” and is “‘unashamedly partisan’”
(quoting Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1484 (S.D. Ind. 1984), rev’d, 478 U.S.
109 (1986))).
117
Jacobson, supra note 110, at 9.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Bush Districts and
118
Gore Districts in the 2002 Plans
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In fact, all the districts in the country with party landslides of over
eighty percent were won by Democrats. In some states, of course,
Democratic-controlled redistrictings artificially plumped the Democrats’ share of the state congressional delegation; in others, Republican-controlled redistrictings artificially plumped the Republicans’
share. Both sides are guilty of taking advantage of such possibilities
because the stakes are so high. In the 1980s, California Democrats
119
were among the most notorious offenders; in 2003, the Texas Re120
publicans were the notable offenders. On balance, however, as Figure 5 shows, the post-2000 census plans advantaged the Republicans.

118

Figure 5 is taken from Hirsch, supra note 81, at 197 fig.2. Figure 5 shows the
number of districts won by Bush and by Gore, broken down by the percentage of the
vote that the winner received in that district. For instance, Bush won by receiving 5055% of the votes in 68 districts, while Gore won with 50-55% of the votes in only 43 districts; Bush did not win a single district by more than 90% of the vote, whereas Gore
won four districts with more than 90% of the vote.
119
See Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (discussing a California redistricting plan that changed the composition of the California legislature from
twenty-two Democrats and twenty-one Republicans to twenty-eight Democrats and seventeen Republicans), aff’d, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).
120
See Note, The Implications of Coalitional and Influence Districts for Vote Dilution Litigation, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2598, 2614 (2004) (“Texas Republicans, having taken control
of the legislature in 2003, attempted to redraw the state’s district lines between decennial censuses to increase the Republican Party’s representation in Congress.”).
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The net effect was to increase the number of Republican districts by
121
nine, from 228 to 237 —perhaps giving Republicans control of the
House for the remainder of the decade.
By making individual districts noncompetitive, partisan gerrymandering also frustrates the representation of centrist views in the
House. Safe districts are drawn to be either more conservative or
more liberal than a non-gerrymandered district would be; their average voter is intended to be reliably off the overall median. Artificially
skewing districts in this way ensures the election of candidates from
particular parties, but also makes it less likely that candidates who reflect the views of these median voters will be elected. In advantaging
one political party, then, partisan gerrymandering not only disadvantages the other major political party and makes districts uncompetitive, but it also makes the representation of centrist views more difficult.
Another feature of elections exacerbates this effect. Deadening
competition between the major parties shifts any real political competition in the district into one party’s primary, where ideological activ122
ists dominate. Centrist candidates of both parties have trouble surviving in safe districts because in the primaries they must appeal to a
group of voters representative neither of the district as a whole, nor of
the party as a whole—rather, the group of voters at primaries repre123
More sharply ideosents only the party’s more partisan members.
logical candidates appeal to this primary electorate. Democratic primary voters vote for more left-leaning candidates than the average
Democrat, let alone the average voter, would, and Republican primary
voters vote for more right-leaning candidates than the average Republican or average voter would. As a result, districts elect candidates
more extreme than the general population of voters in the district,
124
and the House has become bipolar even though the country has

121

Jacobson, supra note 110, at 9 (citing Jacobson, supra note 92, at 5-13).
David Brady & Morris Fiorina, Congress in the Era of the Permanent Campaign, in
THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE 134, 135-36 (Norman Ornstein & Thomas
Mann eds., 2000) (stating that because primary electorates are small and unrepresentative, “members of Congress may be forced to play to noncentrist elements of their
constituencies”).
123
Id.
124
See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing DW-NOMINATE
scores and their suggestion that the ideological gap between political parties has grown
in the last several decades).
122

490

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 459

125

stayed largely in the middle.
Making districts safe thus silences the
center.
Unlike the Framers’ vision, a gerrymandered House does not reflect popular sentiment in all its diversity, but the sentiment of one extreme or the other in districts across the country. And that is not the
worst. Just as polarization within the House is one of the primary effects of partisan gerrymandering, it is also one of the primary causes.
Polarization of a nearly evenly split House greatly raises the stakes of
redistricting and so increases the incentives to gerrymander, which in
turn leads to further polarization in the House. Far from limiting itself, under these conditions, partisan gerrymandering is selfintensifying. Polarization and partisan gerrymandering thus form a
vicious circle where increases in one increase the likelihood of the
other.
The issues surrounding partisan gerrymandering are thus quite
complex. It raises not only the obvious concern of partisan political
bias, but also less obvious concerns like the artificial lock-in of a temporary majority in what was intended to be the most responsive part of
the federal government; reduced competition within districts; reduced accountability and responsiveness of House members; and increased polarization in the legislature. Existing doctrine does not
consider, let alone address, most of these concerns.
B. Saving Politics from Theory: Political Gerrymandering in the Court
126

In Davis v. Bandemer, the Supreme Court first took up the gerrymandering issue and splintered over whether and how to address it.
Although a majority of six Justices believed that partisan gerrymander127
ing claims were justiciable, no majority agreed as to how to handle
128
them.
The decisive plurality of four generally followed the ap125

Democrats Still Hold a Small Lead in Party Identification, According to National Harris
Interactive Survey; Almost No Change in Proportion That Consider Themselves Conservatives,
Liberals and Moderates, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 27, 2004, available at LEXIS, Campaign 2004
News. (“Self-described moderates (40%) continue to outnumber those who consider
themselves conservatives (33%) or liberals (18%). These numbers have been remarkably stable over more than 30 years.”).
126
478 U.S. 109 (1986) (White, J., plurality opinion).
127
Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, id. at 123-25, Powell, and Stevens, id. at 161 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Stevens,
J.,) believed the partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable.
128
Justice White wrote the plurality opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun joined. Id. at 123 (White, J., plurality opinion). Chief Justice Burger
concurred in the judgment, id. at 143 (Burger, C.J., concurring), as did as did Justice
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proach taken in the racial gerrymandering cases, but changed the
governing equal protection standards to account for perceived differ129
The doctrinal shift was dramatic.
ences between race and politics.
Ordinary equal protection doctrine requires a showing of both dis130
Of these two recriminatory intent and discriminatory effects.
131
quirements, intent is usually the more difficult to prove.
In Bandemer, however, the plurality turned that on its head. “As long as
redistricting is done by a legislature,” the plurality wrote, “it should
not be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of
132
Discriminatory effects, by
the reapportionment were intended.”
contrast, would be very difficult to prove. As the plurality described
the standard, “unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the
electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade
a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a
133
whole.”
Two parts of this standard posed special difficulties to plaintiffs.
First, showing that a system consistently degrades a voter’s or group of
voters’ influence requires several election cycles of experience, or very
firm predictive data, which is difficult to obtain. Plaintiffs, then,
would likely not be able to assert any claim until far into the ten-year
districting cycle. Second, plaintiffs had to show not just that the

O’Connor, whose concurring opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, id. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Powell concurred in part and
dissented in part, joined by Justice Stevens. Id. at 161 (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
129
See id. at 141-43 (“We . . . conclude . . . that a threshold showing of discriminatory vote dilution is required for a prima facie case of an equal protection violation.”).
130
See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1980) (“Although dicta may be
drawn from a few of the Court’s earlier opinions suggesting that disproportionate effects alone may establish a claim of unconstitutional racial vote dilution, the fact is that
such a view is not supported by any decision of this Court.”); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or
other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”).
131
See e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1290 (7th Cir. 1977) (“As overtly bigoted behavior has become more unfashionable,
evidence of intent has become harder to find.”); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in
Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1137 (1989) (“Not only is it much more difficult
to prove intent in the housing and employment cases, but, more interestingly, they involve a completely different kind of inquiry.”).
132
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129 (White, J., plurality opinion). In an accompanying
footnote, the plurality softened this view somewhat. It noted that because “discriminatory intent may not be difficult to prove in this context does not, of course, mean that
it need not be proved at all to succeed on such a claim.” Id. at 129 n.11.
133
Id. at 132.

492

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 459

scheme degraded their voting power but also that it degraded their
134
influence on the “political process as a whole.”
135
In Badham v. Eu, for example, a district court found that this
second requirement saved an egregious Democratic gerrymander of
California’s congressional districts after the 1980 census. Since there
were no allegations that California Republicans were “shut out of the
political process” or that anyone had ever “interfered with Republican
registration, organizing, voting, fund-raising, or campaigning” or Re136
publicans’ ability “to speak out on issues of public concern,” the dis137
trict court granted the state’s motion to dismiss. The court, in fact,
dismissed the case with prejudice because other facts of which it took
judicial notice showed that Republicans had some influence in other
parts of the political process. Chief among these facts was that California had a Republican governor, one Republican senator, and a
former Republican governor who, for seven years, had been President
138
of the United States. But of course none of those officials had been
elected from individual districts.
The plurality believed that such a high standard was appropriate
because “the power to influence the political process is not limited to
139
winning elections.” As the plurality in Bandemer stated:
An individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate
is usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have as much opportunity to influence that candidate as
other voters in the district. We cannot presume in such a situation,
without actual proof to the contrary, that the candidate elected will entirely ignore the interests of those voters. This is true even in a safe district where the losing group loses election after election. Thus, a
group’s electoral power is not unconstitutionally diminished by the simple fact of an apportionment scheme that makes winning elections more
difficult, and a failure of proportional representation alone does not
constitute impermissible discrimination under the Equal Protection
140
Clause.

134

Id. (emphasis added).
694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).
136
Id. at 670.
137
See id. at 672 (noting that because California Republicans represent a potent
political force, it is unnecessary for the judiciary to intervene as it would in order to
“protect the trampled rights of a disadvantaged political or racial minority”).
138
Id.
139
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132 (White, J., plurality opinion).
140
Id.
135
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While it is true that voters can achieve some representation even
through representatives they voted against, it is also true that “winning
elections” is the most powerful way to influence the political process
and that artificially making winning elections more difficult for one
group than for others impairs that group’s political power. Not only
did the plurality’s reasoning surprisingly underplay the importance of
elections, it also failed to consider the wider range of concerns raised
by partisan gerrymandering. Although it acknowledged the partisan
141
skew that gerrymandering may give to politics, it did not consider
issues of lock-in, competitiveness, responsiveness, accountability, and
polarization—all of which deeply affect the substance and structure of
politics. The equal protection lens developed by the plurality placed
all these concerns far out of focus.
142
To her credit, Justice O’Connor did look more broadly.
Even
she, however, saw only one larger political concern implicated in the
dispute: whether constitutional regulation of partisan gerrymandering would undermine the two-party system, which she viewed as the
bedrock of our political system. As Justice O’Connor put it:
There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable
two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound
and effective government. The preservation and health of our political
institutions, state and federal, depends to no small extent on the continued vitality of our two-party system, which permits both stability and
143
measured change.

Her fear was that once the Court entered this area it would have
no choice but to apply a proportionality test to all identifiable “political, religious, ethnic, racial, occupational, and socioeconomic
144
And even if the Court limited the inquiry to just political
groups.”
groups, she believed “[t]here is simply no clear stopping point to prevent the gradual evolution of a requirement of roughly proportional
145
If realized, her
representation for every cohesive political group.”
fear would have moved the country towards a coalitional multiparty
141

See id. at 116-17 (acknowledging that a Republican advantage was “achieved by
‘stacking’ Democrats into districts with large Democratic majorities and ‘splitting’
them in other districts so as to give Republicans safe but not excessive majorities in
those districts”).
142
See id. at 144-45 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (expressing concern
that if political gerrymandering becomes justiciable, such judicial intervention will
pose a risk to our political institution).
143
Id.
144
Id. at 147.
145
Id.
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government. That, by itself, was enough for her to deny the courts
146
power to hear these claims.
Her approach represents another version of the “got theory” ar147
gument. Unlike what Justices Frankfurter and Harlan might argue,
Justice O’Connor does not argue that a viable competing theory of
representation underlies partisan gerrymandering. Two-party government, she recognized, is not the aim of partisan gerrymandering.
Rather, artificially “skewed” two-party government is its effect. But
that is still a form of two-party politics. By contrast, imposing a theory
of partisan fairness on the redistricting process would, she believes,
have the effect of undermining what she sees as a foundational value
148
Whether she is right or not, her argument
of our political system.
does extend the frame of analysis to encompass a relevant political
value invisible to ordinary equal protection doctrine, and implicitly
weighs that value against others that judicial intervention would promote. She invokes a type of “got theory” argument to decide what
would make the best pragmatic sense, not to reflexively foreclose judicial inquiry.
149
In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Supreme Court’s recent political gerrymandering decision, the Court surprisingly avoided “got theory” arguments altogether. This case challenged a 2002 Pennsylvania congressional districting scheme that aided Republican congressional
candidates, and which was passed by a Republican-controlled state leg150
The Court reached
islature and signed by a Republican governor.
no majority opinion. Instead, Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality of
151
four Justices, found all political gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable for lack of any judicially manageable standards to us in deciding
152
them. Justice Kennedy, by contrast, found political gerrymandering
146

See id. at 145, 147 (“[N]o group right to an equal share of political power was
ever intended by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
147
Cf. supra text accompanying note 60 (concluding that under Justices Frankfurter and Harlan’s “got theory” argument the mere possibility of a civic rationale
would validate seemingly racial motives).
148
See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 145 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he
proportional representation towards which the Court’s expansion of equal protection
doctrine will lead is [not] consistent with our history, our traditions, or our political
institutions.”).
149
124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).
150
Id. at 1773 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
151
Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s plurality
opinion. Id. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment. Id. at 1792 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
152
See id. at 1778 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (“[N]o judicially discernible and
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claims to be justiciable, but rejected the claim in Vieth itself.
Although the plaintiffs, in his view, had not carried their burden of
showing that judicially manageable standards existed, he believed that
154
others in the future might be able to carry this burden. And Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer believed manageable standards
existed to adjudicate such claims, although they differed somewhat as
155
In short, five Justices believed politito what those standards were.
cal gerrymandering claims were or could be justiciable, while five Justices rejected the political gerrymandering claim in Vieth because no
judicially manageable standards were available to decide it.
This confusing fragmentation on the Court obscures a surprising
and deep agreement. Despite their great differences as to whether
the courts can decide such claims, eight Justices agree that the Constitution forbids at least extreme forms of partisan gerrymandering and
the remaining Justice, Justice Kennedy, believes that it might do so.
The four dissenting Justices, of course, necessarily believe this. Otherwise, they could not authorize judicial intervention. And Justice
Kennedy must hold out this possibility if he truly believes that future
plaintiffs might persuade the Court that judicially manageable stan156
The positions of these five are
dards to address such claims exist.
unsurprising. What is surprising is that the four Justices who held that
no judicially manageable standards exist could believe that the Constitution itself proscribes extreme gerrymandering. As they make clear,
the justiciability problem is epistemological, not ontological. In other
words, they believe a constitutional rule against such gerrymandering

manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged.
Lacking them, we must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable . . . .”).
153
See id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I would not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to
correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases.”).
154
See id. at 1798-99 (“If workable standards do emerge to measure these burdens,
however, courts should be prepared to order relief.”).
155
See id. at 1812 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating a standard that asks
“whether the legislature allowed partisan considerations to dominate and control the
lines drawn, forsaking all neutral principles.”); id. at 1817 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined
by Ginsburg, J.) (calling for a standard that requires “a plaintiff to satisfy elements of a
prima facie cause of action” and then allowing the state to rebut the evidence and “offer an affirmative justification for the districting choices”); id. at 1827-29 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (providing indicia to identify the “unjustified entrenching in power of a
political party that the voters have rejected”).
156
See id. at 1795 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“That no . . . standard has emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in
the future.”).
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exists but that the courts cannot describe it. It is like firmly believing
there is a God, but that knowing anything about this God lies beyond
human understanding.
Justice Scalia makes this clear for the plurality in his criticism of
Justice Stevens’s recognition of individual district-specific gerrymandering claims. Justice Scalia carefully separates out the argument that
political gerrymandering poses no constitutional difficulties, an argument with which he disagrees, from the argument that the courts can
do anything about these difficulties. He writes:
Much of [Justice Stevens’s] dissent is addressed to the incompatibility of
severe partisan gerrymanders with democratic principles. We do not
disagree with that judgment, any more than we disagree with the judgment that it would be unconstitutional for the Senate to employ, in impeachment proceedings, procedures that are incompatible with its obligation to “try” impeachments. The issue we have discussed is not
whether severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but
whether it is for the courts to say when a violation has occurred, and to
design a remedy. . . .
. . . Justice Stevens says we err in assuming that politics is an ordinary
and lawful motive in districting—but all he brings forward to contest that
is the argument that an excessive injection of politics is unlawful. So it is,
157
and so does our opinion assume.

Justiciability difficulties spring not from any doubt that the Constitution forbids some gerrymandering. There is none. They spring
rather from the courts’ inability to identify and correct unconstitutional gerrymandering. Excessive politics is unconstitutional; the
courts, however, cannot tell when the line is crossed.
Given this particular view of why the courts cannot entertain political gerrymandering claims, it is not surprising that “got theory” arguments play no real role in the decision. Those in the strategic position to invoke the arguments, the plurality, share with the dissenters
the belief that the Constitution does have a particular democratic theory which trumps conflicting legislative theories. They just do not
know what it is and, unlike Justice Kennedy, they think that such
knowledge is forever unattainable. This position, although it points to
the same remedial consequence that a “got theory” argument would—
namely, none—has quite different legitimating implications. Unlike

157

Id. at 1785 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (internal citations, some internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted).
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Justices Frankfurter and Harlan’s “got theory” argument, the plurality’s position provides no fig leaf for improper legislative motivations.
It does not pretend to defer to a conflicting but permissible theory of
democracy. It just steps out of the way without making any statement
about what the legislature did and so creates no dangerous false consciousness about legislative motivations. In fact, insofar as it insists
that the Constitution does care about improper partisanship in redistricting but remains silent as to how it cares, the plurality’s position
may encourage citizens to engage and evaluate gerrymanders more
critically. They will, after all, have little by which to judge them other
than their own best “theories” of democratic fair play.
C. The Academic Debate
The academic commentary on partisan gerrymandering looks a
little different. It reaches more widely than the reasoning of the Supreme Court and at times illustrates the more traditional use of the
“got theory” argument as a conversation-stopper. The best example of
the debate is the recent spirited interchange between Samuel Issacharoff and Nathaniel Persily in the Harvard Law Review. In his piece,
Issacharoff criticizes partisan gerrymandering primarily because it
leads to uncompetitive districts, and he ultimately proposes a strong
form of prophylaxis: “[T]he Court should forbid ex ante the participation of self-interested insiders in the redistricting process, instead of
159
In other words, he
trying to police redistricting outcomes ex post.”
would find unconstitutional any plan resulting from a process controlled by insiders. In his response, Persily takes on many of Issacharoff’s claims. He argues, among other things, that incumbent
160
turnover rates are healthy, that congressional districts are largely
161
competitive, and that because incumbency rates are similar in statewide and districted races that gerrymandering cannot be responsible
158

See supra text accompanying notes 13-29, 39-48 (discussing Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan’s “got theory” arguments in Colegrove v. Green and Baker v. Carr, respectively).
159
Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593,
643 (2002) (emphasis added).
160
See Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 654 (2002)
(“[T]here has been steady and significant turnover both in Congress and in state legislatures—a quite healthy level of ‘ritual cleansing’ despite bipartisan gerrymanders.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting Issacharoff, supra note 159, at 615)).
161
See id. at 661-64 (“[A] large share, perhaps a majority, of the districts might be
considered competitive.”).
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162

for any lack of competitiveness.
Both he and Issacharoff impressively mount a wide variety of empirical evidence in support of their
163
respective positions.
At bottom, however, their disagreement is largely normative. Issacharoff believes that most districting plans reflect officeholders’ political self-interest, which impairs political competitiveness, responsiveness, and accountability. Persily, on the other hand, believes that
these are only some of many possible legitimate values and that legislatures should remain free to pursue others. As he puts it:
[F]or several reasons politicians should be in charge of politics. . . .
[C]oncerns about representation and governance are of equal weight to
concerns about electoral competition, and there is no philosophically
uncontestable reason why judges should force one set of values rather
164
than another down the throat of state governments.

To Persily, a constitutional rule, let alone one that takes redistricting out of the hands of legislatures, will foreclose “alternative redis165
tricting strategies [that] maximize . . . welfare in different ways.” In
particular:
One approach might maximize intradistrict competition, another might
try to maximize competition for control of the legislature, another might
seek to maximize the number of voters who are happy with their representative, and still others might seek to increase the probability that government will work better. There are tradeoffs for each approach. Good
arguments can defend each approach, but it would be truly remarkable
for unelected judges with lifetime appointments to decide that competi166
tion is the value that should be placed above all others.

Persily sums up his disagreement with Issacharoff in the final
lines of his piece. Issacharoff’s approach, he believes, suffers from:
[A] preoccupation with one democratic value without situating it in the
political system as a whole. Perhaps district-level competition is “an independent democratic good”; rules governing redistricting need only be
“normatively proper” rather than empirically justifiable; and certain
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See id. at 664-67 (arguing that the causal relationship between gerrymandering
and any lack of competitiveness is undermined by the “high reelection rates of incumbents in statewide races, such as those for the U.S. Senate, which are unaffected by redistricting”).
163
See, e.g., id. at 666 tbl.1 (comparing data on rates of incumbent reelection in
the Senate and House of Representatives to undermine the causal relationship between gerrymandering and any lack of competitiveness).
164
Id. at 678.
165
Id. at 680.
166
Id. (footnote omitted).
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groups, such as moderate voters, should be given greater voice. By
breathing those principles into the Constitution and striking down every
existing districting system, however, judges would be mandating a particularistic and highly contestable vision of the proper working of
American democracy. Those hoping to take the politics out of the redistricting process must be very confident that they have discovered a way to
strike the balance between the competing political values central to democratic government. Lacking that confidence, I would leave the ultimate decision to the admittedly self-interested but more accountable po167
litical bodies that have found various ways of striking the balance.

Sound familiar? Persily is channeling Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan. Like them, he points to other theories of politics as a reason
to foreclose constitutional regulation. Where he differs from his
predecessors is that he offers arguments in support of some of these
168
alternatives. Although many will not agree with his reasoning, he
does defend his theories. Unlike his predecessors, he does not simply
assert or assume their validity.
Another similarity between Persily and his predecessors, however,
undermines his effort to employ these alternative theories to normatively justify districting plans. Like Justices Frankfurter and Harlan,
Persily does not require that any of these theories actually underlie a
169
districting plan. That one could support a plan will suffice.
His reluctance to require a showing that a disputed plan actually embodies a
theory is understandable. Doing so would follow Justice Stewart down
170
How would a court tell the difference between a
his blind alley.
plan embodying a possibly confusing mixture of theories and one
embodying no theory at all? How civically embarrassing would it be to
uncover the actual justification for a plan, which may often be nothing
167

Id. at 680-81 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Issacharoff, supra note 159, at 622,

626).
168

This is particularly true of his argument that maximizing intradistrict homogeneity is normatively attractive. See id. at 668; see, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment Right of Associating, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1209,
1254 (2003) (“[B]y reducing political competition through limiting the pool of individuals the plaintiffs could reach out to for political support . . . [t]he state stunted the
process of democracy.” (footnote omitted)); Issacharoff, supra note 159, at 617 (noting
the “legitimizing role of competition before the electorate”); Spencer Overton, Restraint and Responsibility: Judicial Review of Campaign Reform, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 663,
718 (2004) (“[A] court should aspire to ensure that reforms do not, on the whole, diminish competition.”).
169
See Persily, supra note 160, at 680-81 (noting the many values that might underlie a districiting plan and observing that “good arguments can defend each approach”).
170
See supra text accompanying notes 65-66 (arguing that Justice Stewart’s approach is unmanageable because it requires difficult judicial inquiry).
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more than incumbent self-interest? In short, Persily is absolutely
right, as were Justices Frankfurter and Harlan before him. Imposing
one particular theory on politics comes at a loss, for it displaces other
possibly valid theories. But his own approach, like Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan’s, fails to require—or even make likely—that a districting
plan will embody any theory at all.
This is not to say that Issacharoff is right. His approach will strike
many as exceeding clear constitutional authority. Indeed, any broad
ex ante prophylactic approach will be controversial in this way. It is
easy, though, to see his motivation. Putting districting into the hands
of people who have no direct partisan or incumbency interest in its
outcome would presumably reduce the influence of these types of selfinterest, while leaving room for the plan to reflect the types of values
171
Persily mentions —and others. Although Issacharoff is concerned
with competitiveness and incumbent entrenchment, he does not actually impose competitiveness on the redistricting process to the exclusion of other values. Rather, Issacharoff tries to remove direct incumbency and partisan concerns from the process as much as possible so
that other more legitimate values may flourish. Unless I am misreading him, an independent redistricting commission should be free to
follow the kinds of policies Persily advocates if it thought them wise.
That leaves two other options. One is to follow the course the
Court itself took in the original reapportionment cases. There the
Court imposed a particular theory of representation on the redistrict172
It did not do so,
ing process to the exclusion of other theories.
however, because the theory was incontestably better than all others.
It was not. It did so rather because the theory was easy to administer
173
and had some democratic virtues and, most importantly, because
imposing some theory was the only way to ensure that any theory other
174
than legislative self interest underlay districting schemes.
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See Persily, supra note 160, at 680 (arguing that redistricting should be delegated to those who are able to “strike the balance between the competing political values central to democratic government”).
172
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that state legislative districts must be divided equally by population).
173
See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 121 (1998) (“In fact, administrability is [the] long suit [of the one person, one
vote principle] . . . .”).
174
See text accompanying notes 70-71 (arguing that the one person, one vote standard was chosen because it was an administrable theory of apportionment that would
ensure some theoretical basis).
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In the gerrymandering context, there is no simple, obvious candidate for such a theory, but there are several messy contenders. One
approach would be to return to so-called traditional redistricting
principles like geographical compactness, contiguity, and preserving
175
While clear,
political subdivisions and communities of interest.
agreed-upon yardsticks to measure these factors are unavailable, and
trade-offs among them can be made in many legitimate ways, forcing
some concern for these issues would reduce the freedom legislators
now have to pursue unwholesome ends.
A quite different approach, which was argued by some in Vieth v.
176
Jubelirer, looks to legislative motive.
Like Issacharoff’s approach, it
seeks to prevent bad motives from infecting districting plans, but does
so through ex post review rather than ex ante prophylactic structuring. This approach would follow the controversial lead of the Court’s
177
178
Shaw v. Reno line of cases. Many have criticized that line of cases,
but their aim is to screen plans after enactment for impermissible levels of racial motivation. The Court could take a similar (and perhaps
similarly uncomfortable) approach with respect to certain partisan
and incumbency motivations. In fact, the dissenters in Vieth argued
179
different combinations of these two approaches. It was their messiness, however, that persuaded the plurality that no judicially manageable standards existed.
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See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993).
176
See 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1812 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating a standard that
asks “whether the legislature allowed partisan considerations to dominate and control
the lines drawn, forsaking all neutral principles”).
177
The Supreme Court has held that while race may be a factor in districting, a
plan which is primarily motivated by racial considerations to the point of subordinating traditional districting principles is unconstitutional. For examples from this line of
cases, see Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541
(1999); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
178
See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw
Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287 (1996) (exploring the tensions introduced into districting by
the Shaw line of cases); see also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H.
PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 906 n.3 (2d ed. 2002) (noting the plethora of articles
written in response to the Shaw line of cases).
179
See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1799 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the shared
view of all dissenters it would be “profoundly unwise to foreclose all judicial review of
similar claims” in the future).
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CONCLUSION
The “got theory” argument, as employed by Justice Frankfurter,
Justice Harlan, and Professor Persily, of course, easily avoids the difficulties of these alternative approaches. In avoiding difficulty, however, it does both too little and too much. It does too little in allowing
plans reflecting only legislative self-interest to escape scrutiny. It does
too much in suggesting that the reason plans should do so is that they
actually reflect some lofty theory of politics. The “got theory” argument can be both a boon and a trap. When used by Justice O’Connor
in Bandemer or by Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove, it can help deepen
discussion. Although both Justices’ views in those cases are controver180
sial, they invoked this type of argument to analyze political concerns
to which ordinary First Amendment doctrine is blind. When used by
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan in Baker or by some academicians in
the current debate, however, the argument has exactly the opposite
effect. By holding out the likely false hope that a districting plan embodies a public-regarding purpose, it forecloses analysis of what the
plan actually does. It stops rather than furthers conversation.
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See, e.g., Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1822 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing, contrary to
Justice O’Connor’s Bandemer concurrence, that there exist “applicable judicially manageable standards”). In Colegrove, Justice Frankfurter held that Congress had exclusive
authority over the Illinois districting. However, the majority in Baker v. Carr found that
a similar matter presented a justiciable cause of action. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

